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REVIEWED BY RICHARD A. BARNES*
Unlike twenty years ago, today's students of international law and politics
cannot remain impervious to the notion of democratic governance, which has
become so fundamental and pervasive in the literature and understanding of
their disciplines. Along with respect for the rule of law, protection of human
rights, sustainable development, protection of the environment, and, arguably,
greater economic equality, democratic governance is an important facet of the
holy-grail that is the ideal form of social organization. Yet, for all the rhetoric
surrounding the notion of democratic governance, and there is a considerable
amount of it, there appears to be little real consensus about what the notion
means; what the content of it is and should be; its theoretical and conceptual
basis; and, perhaps most importantly for international lawyers, whether it
exists as an international legal norm. Any publication that can serve as a
guiding light through these complex issues is to be strongly welcomed.
Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth have produced just such a book.'
Democratic Governance and InternationalLaw is a collection of nineteen
essays from leading writers on democracy in the fields of international law
and political science. Although most of these essays have been published
elsewhere, bringing them together in a single volume has great value, for
much of the work in this area is quite disparate and an understanding of the
core issues should be as broadly informed as possible. This book also
includes new material and a useful introduction by the editors that sets out the
conceptual background to the issues and the relationship between law and
politics.
In Part I of this Review, I consider the individual essays, highlighting what
they seek to add to the discourse on democracy and international law. In Part
* Sir Q.W. Lee and Dr. Peter Thompson Lecturer in Maritime Law, The University of Hull Law
School, Hull, England.
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H, I evaluate the overall contribution of the book. In particular, I analyze
whether international law is capable of effecting a supervisory role over an
emerging norm of democratic governance.
I.
Democratic Governance and International Law breaks down into five
broad areas in an effort to provide a well-rounded perspective on the nature
and implications of the right to democratic governance in international law.
Part I of the collection considers the systematic foundation of the right, and
it is fitting that the first contribution is by Thomas M. Franck, who has been
particularly influential in this area.2 Franck first advanced the right-orientated
thesis that international law is beginning to embrace a norm of democratic
governance, according to which international law evaluates the legitimacy of
national governments. For Franck, democracy means that the right to govern
is to be derived from the consent of the governed. His analytical focus is the
relatively uncontroversial issue of election monitoring, although this issue is
still fraught with difficulties. I do not suggest that Franck is unaware of the
implications of democracy, but rather that election control might be as much
as the "frail" international system can presently sustain.
In the next essay, Gregory H. Fox adopts a similarly positive outlook for
democracy.' Framing the question as the right to political participation in
international law, Fox seeks to show how this right now has a firm grounding
in human rights law and the practice of multilateral election monitoring.
Although Fox restricts his survey to the procedural right of elections, this
focus is not a rejection of other substantive democratic tenets but a recognition
that elections are the means by which other democratic goals are to be
achieved. Fox also recognizes that international law has not and is not ready
to incorporate and advance an all-encompassing notion of democracy.
This essay is followed by James Crawford's skeptical review of.
2. Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 25. See also Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based
Prospects for a New Global Order. 22 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 601 (1990); Thomas M. Franck, The
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 46 (1992); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995).
3. Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 48.
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democratic governance in international legal doctrine.4 He starts by outlining
the profoundly undemocratic nature of classical international law as
manifested in certain key principles such as non-intervention, recognition of
the executive's power to make binding commitments on behalf of the State,
and the absence of autonomous rights in respect of remedies. This situation
developed not only because the majority of States were undemocratic but also
because of the structure of international law. He states that as recently as
1986, in the Nicaragua v. United States case before the International Court of
Justice,' this State-centric view of the international order has been clearly
prevalent. However, Crawford notes the systemic changes in the nature of
international law. He then highlights the developing practice of election
monitoring by international organizations, moves to institutionalize this
practice, and the work of human rights organizations in the democratic
governance and other areas. Crawford identifies a tension between what is,
what could be, and what should be; and he warns about being unrealistic in
our evaluation of the evolution of democratic governance. In a reprise to his
original essay, Crawford emphasizes the obstacles to establishing a right to
democracy in international law. First, much disagreement still exists about the
articulation of such a right at the international level, as evidenced by the long
debates in April 1999 behind the first resolution of the Commission on Human
Rights on the subject of democracy.6 Such disagreements have carried
through to State practice, which has been inconsistent in recent years. Second,
there is the issue ofjusticiability or the margin of appreciation. This doctrine
is often relied on as a means of avoiding judicial scrutiny of certain issues that
are politically sensitive, such as issues of democratic governance that run to
the heart of a State's political order.
Part II of the book contains three essays on recent developments in inter-
State relations concerning democracy. Sean D. Murphy considers the impact
of democracy as a criterion for the recognition of States and governments.7
After reviewing traditional theory, past practice, and contemporary practice
4. James Crawford, Democracy and the Body of International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note I, at 91.
5. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 103 (June 27).
6. Promotion of the Right to Democracy, E.S.C. Res. 1999/57, U.N. ESCOR, Sess., Commission
on Human Rights, U.N. Doc EtCN.4/RES/1999/57 (1999).
7. Sean D. Murphy, Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 123.
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he concludes that democracy (democratic legitimacy) is one element among
many in States' recognition practice. Although democracy is an increasingly
important consideration, States still take account of other factors such as
economic development, peace and security, and the effectiveness and stability
of the regime in control of the State.
Stephen J. Schnably considers the impact of democracy in the practice of
the Organization of American States In this context, a clear tension exists
between democracy and respect for the principle of non-intervention; and a
failure to resolve this tension has undermined the role of the OAS. A differing
approach is provided by Anne-Marie Slaughter, who looks not to the
empowerment of international institutions such as the United Nations as the
way forward for democracy, but rather to the evolving practice of formal and
informal governmental networks as the most realistic hope for asserting
democratic principles.9 This arises principally because States are unwilling
to cede power to international organizations. Thus, direct transnational
interaction between the diffuse organs of the State is becoming more popular.
Yet, it remains to be seen whether this process, which is more typical of
Western liberal democracies, actually embodies notions of democratic
accountability. The deficiencies of traditional forms of co-operation through
regional institutions can be evaluated against the scope and aims of their
constitutional documents, but the impact of informal arrangements is far more
difficult to assess. As there is no formal recognition of the role of government
networks, accountability remains a concern. Unless transparency and
certainty over the impact of such processes are present, government networks
may reinforce the traditional undemocratic features of international law by
consolidating the position of the State over the individual. In this prescriptive
process, the benefits of greater pluralitywill be lost.
Part I of the book contains five essays on the relationship between
democracy and the use of force. W. Michael Reisman juxtaposes the criteria
of defacto or effective control with that of democratic entitlement, arguing
that developments since the Tinoco Case show that democracy has overtaken
effectiveness as the factor that legitimates goverments.l° He contends that
8. Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutionalism and the Democratic Government in the Inter-American
System, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 155.
9. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note i, at 199.
10. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, in
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sovereignty today can only mean popular sovereignty. Yet things are not as
clear-cut as this, and effectiveness still has an important role to play. At the
end of the day, a truly legitimate government would demonstrate both
democracy and effective control. Reisman argues for the removal of any
anachronistic notions of sovereignty by a process of actualization, an updating
of the meaning of the term to match its contemporary understanding.
It is difficult to disagree with the actualization process, but it is a task to
be undertaken with a great deal of caution. Apart from such conceptual
obstacles, the practical problems include determining the "people," the "will
of the people," and the requisite course of action necessary to realign their will
with a system of political organization. To Reisman's credit, he acknowledges
the practical problems that flow from this approach and hints at a solution in
the form of centralized international institutions specifically equipped to deal
with the issues. Yet, from this uncertain position, he then continues to
advocate the unilateral use of force to reassert democratic rights. He justifies
this position on the basis that sanctions, which admittedly acknowledge
community support for human rights, are non-discriminatory and thus ill-
suited as sanctions against the party responsible for violating the basic rights. "t
Despite Reisman's moral defense of the short-term legitimacy of unilateral
intervention, and apart from the legal ramifications, there remain equally
powerful moral and legal arguments against intervention. One has to question
whether every instance of intervention would be beneficial. Will it destabilize
the State and perhaps the regional or international order? Will it actually
achieve success or merely compound the difficulties faced by the native
population?
It is precisely these questions which Michael Byers and Simon
Chesterman ask in their contribution.' 2 They adopt a more traditionalist
approach to the issue with strong positivist overtones. Whereas Reisman
advocates unilateral intervention to sustain popular sovereignty, Byers and
Chesterman maintain that the right to democratic governance is not as simple
as popular sovereignty and that those seeking to intervene are themselves
restrained by rules of law - principally the international legal prohibition on
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 239.
11. Id. at 248. Iraq is seen to be a case in point.
12. Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, "You, the People": Pro-Democratic Intervention in
International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 259.
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the use of force. The essay proceeds to outline the precise limits of the
limitation on the use of force and the exceptional situations in which it can
lawfully be used, showing that Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
cannot be interpreted in a manner permitting the use of force other than in
individual or collective self defense. This is reaffirmed by practice, 3 judicial
authority, 14 and the fact that any new rule of custom (permitting, for example,
humanitarian intervention) must meet the rigorous requirements set out in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Case.5 Although the outcome might be
unpalatable, Byers and Chesterman are convinced that strong limitations exist
on using force to enforce the right of democratic governance. These same
limitations preclude the expansion of actions under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter to include humanitarian intervention, unless there exist other
destabilizing factors such as genocide or massive refugee movements. Of
course, it remains open to Reisman, and those of a similar persuasion, to
suggest that the limitation on the use of force was designed to deal with inter-
State conflicts, that these are of peripheral concern in contrast to internal
conflict and systematic human rights abuses, and that to subject intervention
to such a limitation is a denial of the reality of the problems facing
contemporary international society.
The next two essays concentrate on a specific form of intervention-
intervention by invitation, with David Wippman making the case for such
intervention, 6 and Brad Roth arguing to the contrary.' We can distinguish
between two different situations where an invitation is extended. In the first
situation, a government that retains both political legitimacy and a substantial
degree of de facto control over the country issues an invitation. The
intervention of the United Kingdom in Tanganyika in 1964, which received
general acquiescence, provides an example.'8 In the second situation, the
13. Thus, the U.S. did not formally explain its intervention in Panama, or its missile strikes on Iraq,
or its actions in Grenada, on the grounds of democratic intervention. Id.
14. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.) 1949 I.C.J. 4,35 (Apr. 9); Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.CJ. 14, 133 (June 27).
15. (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. REP. 3, at 41 (Feb. 20).
16. David Wippman, Pro-DemocraticIntervention byInvitation, in DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 293.
17. Brad R. Roth, The Illegality of"Pro-Deniocratic"Invasion Pacts, in DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 328.
18. See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the
Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 189 n.4 (1985).
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legitimate government is ousted by a coup and a regime assumes de facto
control over the nation. Although there is general agreement that intervention
in the former context is permitted, substantial disagreement exists about the
permissibility of intervention by invitation in the latter. Wippman
concentrates on this latter intervention context. Wippman's argument is that
consent allows a deviation from the accepted norms on the use of force, and
so the crux of the issue becomes the determination and legitimacy of the
consent expressed. Given the paucity of practice in this area, much of the
discussion is speculative; yet Wippman maintains that the benefits of
intervention outweigh the risks. Indeed, any use of force entails risks; so why
should intervention by invitation be discounted on this ground. The risks need
to be minimized, and Wippman leans towards some form of collective
appreciation of the quality of the ousted regime's democratic credentials
before intervention takes place. Ideally this should take place within the
United Nations, which turns the discussion into one about the legitimacy of
such collective action. Intervention might be possible in other circumstances,
but Wippman highlights the acute difficulties in facilitating intervention. The
issue whether political legitimacy or effectiveness is the prevailing basis for
international authority is a question that has not been fully resolved.
Roth takes a narrower view on the legality of pro-democratic invasion
pacts. The peremptory nature of the prohibition on the use of force can only
be questioned in the face of other equally fundamental imperatives, such as
self-defense or the prohibitions against genocide and slavery. Despite the
current popularity of democracy, Roth strongly doubts whether it has
sufficient status to qualify the prohibition on the use of force. Roth further
doubts the utility of consent as a means of derogating from the limitations on
the use of force. It is often said that the greater includes the lesser, but such
syllogistic reasoning does not automatically apply so simply to the present
issue. Although a State can extinguish its sovereignty by merging with
another State (the recent example of Germany stands out), it does not follow
that a State can voluntarily rid itself of those features that make it a State and
still remain a State. There is a minimum functional core to the notion of
sovereignty that cannot be incrementally diminished, which includes some
aspect of the doctrine of effective control. He also points out that the problem
with generic invasion pacts is that the logic used to support them could apply
to undemocratic pacts, such as the Holy Alliance of the nineteenth century or
2000]
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the Brezhnev Doctrine of the twentieth century. Roth finally considers
consociational pacts as a possible exception to the rule. These, however, fall
foul of many of the same problems, in particular the fact that such pacts seek
to set in concrete some form of socio-political organizations that cannot
always be guaranteed to be the true manifestation of the will of the people.
By focusing on the past will of the people, such pacts divert attention from an
evaluation of the present will, which is of course the true measure of a
regime's legitimacy.
In the final essay in this section, John M. Owen IV considers the "peace
thesis:" the idea that liberal States (democratic regimes) do not fight each
other, and thus the goal of liberalism is justified by the benefits that are
brought to the international system. 9 Noting that the peace thesis is often
inadequately supported, Owen seeks to empirically test the causal link
between liberalism and peace. Owen presents a qualified version of the peace
thesis, arguing that liberalism can help achieve peace through the use of
liberal ideology and liberal institutions working in tandem. This thesis is then
tested in four case studies: Franco-American relations 1796-1798, Anglo-
American relations 1803-1812, Anglo-American relations 1861-1863, and
Anglo-American relations 1895-1896. From these case studies, Owen
concludes that there is a causal link between liberalism and peace °.2 The case
studies are not conclusive evidence of an absolute link, but instead offer a
plausible account of how liberal values are a constant within the political
discourse that shape inter-State relations. Limitations are acknowledged when
power politics have heavily circumscribed liberalism. Owen also makes clear
that perceptions of liberalism play as much a role in the process as do actual
instances of liberalism.
Owen is to be applauded for his balanced approach, seeking to reconcile
liberalism with realism and acknowledging that liberalism is only one factor
among others that motivate States towards war or peace. Owen deserves
credit also for highlighting other goals that international society actively
pursues, such as sovereignty or stability. Given the complexity of the issues
and varying goals, he cautions against the indiscriminate pursuit of liberalism
because of the unintended consequences that might follow. Vietnam and the
19. John M. Owen, IV, International Lawand theLiberalPeace, in DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCEAND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 343.
20. Id. at 348. It is notable that more contemporary accounts of the impact of liberalism are absent.
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Balkans are testament to this cautionary advice. More critically, one also
suspects that a truly definitive empirical account of the peace thesis is an
impossible task given the multiplicity and complexity of these factors.
The penultimate section cgnsiders the problems raised by conflicting
imperatives. Gregory H. Fox and Georg Nolte grapple with a particularly
thorny issue in their essay "Intolerant Democracies."21 They pose the
question: to what extent should a democratic State tolerate anti-democratic
forces that seek to extinguish democracy, such as occurred during the rise of
the Nazi Party under the Weimar Constitution in the early 1930's or the rise
of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria in 1991 ? The crux of the problem
is that in order for a democratic society to continue to exist, it may have to
sacrifice some of its democratic credentials to suppress such undemocratic
forces. The authors favor measures to constrain anti-democratic forces and
seek to substantiate this in theory and practice. A review of State practice
shows that in most western democracies some form of protection against anti-
democratic forces exists. This situation conforms to Rawl's observation that
"U]ustice does not require that men must stand idly by while others destroy
the basis of their existence."22 A brief review of treaty law shows support for
the notion that restrictions on anti-democratic forces are justified.23 More
difficult is the question of how to exercise this power. In treaty law, such
restrictions have to be necessary or reasonable, but this is in turn subject to the
State's margin of appreciation. So, although there are rules in place that
circumscribe States' responses to anti-democratic forces, these rules remain
precarious and subject to abuse.
In his response, Martti Koskenniemi expresses skepticism about Fox and
Nolte's justification of intolerant democracies, and is disturbed by this
paternalistic approach to liberal democracy.24 In the first place, he feels that
as observers we are poorly placed to judge a conflict and run the risk of neo-
imperialism. Fox and Nolte's analysis also reveals a general failure to
appreciate the full gamut of democratic potentialities and a tendency to focus
21. Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note I, at 389.
22. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 218 (1971).
23. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 22, para. 2, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 , 178. See also European Convention on Human Rights, Mar. 20, 1952, art. 17,213 U.N.T.S.
221,234.
24. Martti Koskenniemi, Whose Intolerance, Which Democracy?., in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 436.
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on a limited range of procedural or Westernized conceptions of democracy.
A false association of democracy and peace further compounds this obsession
with a particular form of democracy. Returning to the fundamental problem
of the commentators' acceptance of universal (Westernized) norms of
democracy, Koskenniemi calls for a greater degree of active participation and
inclusive understanding in the socio-political process of other States. Similar
concerns are voiced by Roth, who notes that, although Fox and Nolte commit
themselves to a substantive view of democracy, they hold back from
substantiating this, perhaps realizing that to do so would provoke ideological
confrontation.25 By limiting themselves to a notion of democracy that is
essentially procedural - one that facilitates the "choice" of the people - they
are unable to justify adequately their withholding of choice from those
exercising it. In reply to these criticisms, Fox and Nolte reassert their
credentials.26 Their thesis is to be understood against a background of change
in the way in which democracy is appreciated at the international level.
Certain core elements to democracy are emerging that give credence to their
appreciation of the normative role of democracy in contrast to the agnosticism
of Koskenniemi and Roth.
In the final essay in this section, Stephen Ratner considers the interaction
of democracy and accountability.2 7 States facing the transition to democracy
must reckon with their undemocratic legacies and decide whether or how to
hold former leaders responsible for human rights atrocities. Experience shows
that holding past regimes accountable for their wrongs can interfere with the
transition to democracy. Although accountability is seen as a feature of a
democratic regime, it is often sacrificed for civil stability. As a result, the
duty to punish, if conceived of as merely criminal prosecution, is, in Franckian
terminology, lacking coherence or adherence because States will offset the
costs of holding individuals to account against the prospects of sustainable
democracy. Ratner suggests that, if we adopt a broader conception of
accountability, to include truth commissions, amnesties, investigations, or
lustration, accountability and democracy are easier to reconcile.
25. Brad R. Roth, Democratic Intolerance: Observations on Fox and Nolte, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note I, at 441.
26. Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, A Defence of the "Intolerant Democracies" Thesis, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 445.
27. Steven R. Ratner, Democracy and Accountability: The Criss-Crossing Paths of Two Emerging
Norms, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note I. at 449.
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Rounding off the book is a series of essays that offer a critical perspective
on democratic governance. The essays by Roth, Jan Knippers Black, and
Susan Marks stress the dangers of indulging in messianism and complacency
by overstating the case for the democratic ideal. Roth emphasizes that the
concept of democracy is not well enough understood and that assumptions
made about it are not universally attractive.28 These invariably link
democracy to liberalism. Without denying the validity of narrow or liberal
conceptions of democracy, Roth urges us not to consider democracy "in
isolation from egalitarian social policies."29 To do this would intensify
exclusion in the face of economic inequality and power disparities. Popular
sovereignty and constitutionalism are progress to be welcomed, but they
should not be regarded as sufficient, or synonymous with democracy.
Jan Knippers Black offers us a sober reminder of the other stakes in the
global economy." Drawing on the experience of Latin America, she shows
that wealth, power, and their redistribution, do not always sit comfortably with
democracy. It is difficult to disagfee with the author that democratic progress
must be measured alongside politics, the global market, and other socio-
economic factors. The link between democracy and these other factors is
profoundly complex. Although assumptions should not be made, it seems
likely that these factors operate to entrench existing power structures and
undermine international law's ability to facilitate democracy.
By citing the pro-democratic theses within the broader school of liberal
millenarianism, Susan Marks highlights some of the crucial concerns that
should circumscribe our wholehearted embrace of democratic governance."
Unless the notion of democracy is fully explored and understood, it would be
foolhardy to pursue it as a visionary ideology. Pro-democratic theses often
portray democracy as being identifiable, stable, and coherent, when in reality
it embraces a wide diversity of ideas and principles. The narrow focus on
elections serves to obscure other issues at the heart of democracy from view.
Hand in hand with this goes the risk of establishing cosmetic democracy -
28. Brad R. Roth, Evaluating Democratic Progress, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 493.
29. Id. at 505.
30. Jan Knippers Black, What Kind of Democracy Does the Democratic Entitlement Entail?, in
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 517.
31. Susan Marks, International Law. Democracy, and the End of History, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 532.
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elections that disguise the actual lack of democratic credentials of a
government. There is also a strong tension between democracy and liberalism
as the two are not entirely synonymous, although this is often made out to be
the case. The author raises questions about the place of liberalism in the
ongoing process of globalization that have not been fully explored. The peace
thesis is also heavily circumscribed, failing to account for internal conflict and
other non-State conflict." The peace thesis suggests that global liberalism
will lead to global peace, thus advocating liberalism and countenancing the
rejection of other forms of government. For Marks, this is liberal imperialism
and is as unacceptable as any other form of imperialism. As if this were not
enough, liberal millenarianism risks the dangerous complacency that flows
from the overly optimistic and false perception of liberalism as a panacea.
II.
If it does indeed contain a norm of democratic governance, international
law would impose on States the obligation to ensure that democratic principles
are respected as a mode of national socio-political organization. This poses
a number of questions that Democratic Governance and International Law
explores. What is democracy? Does a right to democracy exist? And what
does such a .right entail? In exploring these questions, most of the essays
make the assumption that international law is well placed to facilitate a norm
of democratic governance. This is an assumption that requires further
investigation. It can be argued that structural and normative deficiencies in
international law are counter-productive to international law supervising a
right of democratic governance, which in turn weakens the notion of
democratic governance at a fundamental level.33 There are two facets to this
problem: (1) international law's lack of democratic credentials, and (2)
international law's structural and normative limitations. The crux of the issue
is that democracy is a form of accountability, and accountability is severely
attenuated at the international level. Although the structure of international
law has changed in the twentieth century, existing structures in key areas
remain unchanged and so militate against many of the claims for democratic
governance.
32. Id. at 561 ("[P]eace may entail more than a failure to resort to arms.").
33. See. e.g., Crawford, supra note 4, at 114 (discussing idea of"modified skepticism").
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Implicit in the statement that "the will of the people shall be the basis of
the authority of government" is the hope that individuals will participate
equally in the ordering of their social context. 4 However, the relationship
between domestic law and international law is not so fluid as to ensure this
outcome, nor can international law by itself be seen to facilitate it. To focus
on democratic governance at the domestic level is to paint half of the picture.
Philip Allott has pointed out a serious flaw in the theory of representation as
it operates at the international level. 5 The system contains a false dialectic
that distorts the obtainability of social objectives. In theory, the State as a
receptacle of collective interests should represent these interests at the
international level. During the conception and development of international
law, however, the process became distorted; and, instead of aggregating
individual and sub-national interests, the respective aggregations of State
interests came to be seen as original interests. Thus, the international system
became a process of interaction between notional national interests. This
dynamic is reflected in the priority of State rights over individual rights.
Hersch Lauterpacht also pointed out the ambiguous position of individuals at
the level of international law. Although the idea that individuals are the "true
subjects of international law" has been argued, there are no means by which
they contribute to its making.36
The disaggregation of individual interests is clear in the way in which
classical international legal doctrine has developed, and we should recall
James Crawford's six defects in classical international legal doctrine. First,
international law assumes that the executive can make commitments binding
on the State and hence individuals, without their consent or knowledge.
Second, national law, no matter how democratic, is an excuse for a failure to
comply with international law. Third, the individual has no autonomous rights
in respect of remedies. These lie in the hands of the executive. Fourth, there
is the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States. Fifth, the
principle of self-determination cannot interfere with existing territorial
boundaries. Sixth, there are seemingly no limits on the power of a
34. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 21, at
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). [hereinafter Human Rights Declaration]
35. Philip Allott, Mare Nostrum: A New International Law of the Sea, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 764, 775
(1992). See also PHILIP ALLOTT, EuNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 306-10 (1990).
36. 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 148 (Elihu
Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
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government to bind the State for the future.37 Classical international law
prioritizes the State and its institutions over the individual, which may well
render international law incompatible with more substantive notions of
democracy. I am not asserting that this classical position prevails absolutely
today, and indeed some inroads have been made. Thus, individuals can
petition human rights bodies directly, and domestic jurisdiction is no longer
as absolute as it once was. The point is that a deep-rooted State-centric model
of international law cannot be easily overturned. This process is only just
beginning.
It is notjust a matter of reconceiving modes of representation through the
States; it is also a matter of reconceiving the process of law creation between
States and between other international agencies. Even if we consider just
briefly how law is created and power exercised at the international level, the
need is quite apparent. Treaties, despite their "contractual" element, are
invariably affected by extra-legal inequalities between the participants.
Although sovereign equality suggests that treaties are negotiated on an equal
footing, an element of bargaining power will come into play distorting that
equality. As Byers notes, that power is "less constrained by the law of treaties
than it is by most national laws of contract."38 States can utilize economic and
military means to supplement their sovereign equality and so distort the law
creation process.39 Another problem is that States are able to participate in the
law creation process and yet opt out of the implementation stage by failing to
ratify the agreement.' In the formation of customary international law, no
formal weight is given to individual State practice, meaning that more
powerful States can influence the development of law in a disproportionate
manner.4' If the law creation process is unrepresentative, then questions must
be asked about the development of substantive rules of democracy that purport
37. See Tinoco Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), I R.I.A.A. 369 (1923).
38. MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 36, n. 11 (1999).
39. See CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 149 (1957); R.R.
Baxter, Treaties and Custom, in 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 25 (1970); Alain Pellet, The Normative
Dilemma: Will and Consent in International Law-Making. 12 AUST. Y.B. INT'L L. 22 (1992).
40. This was clearly the case regarding the participation by the U.S. in the development of the United
National Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 lL.M. 1261 (1982), which the U.S. has failed to ratify. As
a package deal, the treaty represented a trade-off of various interests, and the U.S. has been left open to
criticism of subverting the treaty as a result.
41. See Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power. Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice, in THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KRZYSZTOF
SKUBISZEWSKI 536-37 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
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to be in line with the expectations of the broader community.
The process of international law is equally skewed at the institutional
level with little evidence of the democratic credentials that are expected at the
domestic level. Many features of the United Nations reflect this situation. For
example, consider the Security Council and the use of the veto. The five
permanent members have exercised their veto power over numerous measures
that were perceived contrary to their national interests.42 Important measures
such as the authorization of collective security or the imposition of sanctions
were often vetoed. Schnably raises similar points with regard to the
independence of the Organization of American States (OAS) from its
member's interests. 3 Although the United Nations General Assembly is
perceived as an agency of policy formulation, the normative results of this are
not formally guaranteed. Indeed, there is much dispute about the normative
value of General Assembly resolutions. As statehood is a prerequisite of
membership, one can question whether or not the United Nations is truly
representative of the global community. The position of indigenous peoples,
minorities, and other self-determination groups is well documented elsewhere.
Because States remain the principal agents of international law, the
independence and function of international organizations are compromised.
This lack of independence and representation runs counter to the claim of
international law on legitimate domestic systems of representation. These
structural deficiencies affect the content of international law.
If we examine the development of substantive rules (e.g., recognition and
intervention), then the above criticism is borne out. As an exercise of
sovereignty, recognition remains a discretionary act. Although loose
conditions for recognition exist, there is no hierarchy among them, reducing
recognition to subjectivism. In practice, subjectivism is manifest in the
arbitrary and inconsistent use of recognition." Advocates of democracy
42. See Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: The UN's Roles in International Society
Since 1945, in UNITEDNATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE UN'S ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1,39-
43 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed., 1993).
43. SCHNABLY, supra note 8, at 155.
44. Take, for example, the refusal of the EC to recognize Macedonia as a State. Although Macedonia
met the EC's criteria, Greece objected for political reasons. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration
Commission, Conference on the Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European
Community and its Member States, Opinion No. 6, 31 I.L.M. 1507 (Jan. 11, 1992). Another example
involves the lack of recognition by the U.S. of North Korea and Communist China. MORTON A. KAPLAN
&NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-28 (1961).
2000]
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 8:281
would have democratic governance be the decisive criterion for recognition,
although this cannot be considered to be the-case at present. 5 The act of
recognition tends to provide us with a static reference point for the prevailing
opinion on a regime's or State's legitimacy at a particular point in time. This
situation contrasts with the notion that democratic governance is a dynamic
and ongoing process and raises questions as to how well suited recognition is
to the question of democratic governance.
If different States can reach different conclusions as to the legal capacity
of a State when the same facts present themselves, then ineffective or
countervailing legal rules are operating. Not only does this undermine the
quality of rules, but it also raises serious questions about the capacity of
international law to apply systematically rules of fundamental importance,
ones that enable an entity to participate in the international prescriptive
process. Apart from certain political repercussions, adverse legal
consequences do not flow from the recognition of an illegitimate government.
This lack of legal constraints weakens the argument that the rule of law
prevails at the international level.
It has already been pointed out that the tension between democratic
intervention and the restriction on the use of force remains unresolved both in
practice and in doctrine.46 The law is clearly equivocal on the matter. Like
recognition, the right of intervention has been applied in an arbitrary manner.47
How are we to evaluate United States interventions in Panama, Haiti,
Grenada, and Nicaragua? Overlapping concerns, such as the protection or
affirmation of democracy, the protection of human rights, self-defense, and
maintaining international peace and security obfuscate the matter and make
the identification of the core legal regime difficult. Reaction to intervention
often depends on its success, yet this cannot be the legitimating factor.
Neither should the identity of the intervening actor. If international law is
incapable of applying fundamental laws in a systematic manner, then surely
this casts into doubt its credentials as a guarantor of democracy. Some of the
contributors touch upon these issues. For example, Franck raises the question
of "the legitimacy of the increasing international validation of the
45. Murphy, supra note 7, at 153.
46. See generally, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at Part III.
47. Crawford, supra note 4, at 106.
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governance, and the rules and processes of that validation."" For him, this
question is to be answered by the existence and quality of rules and
procedures by which democracy is judged."
It is easy to accuse those who discern a normative basis for the right to
democracy in the historical development of human rights law. How can
human rights law be the basis of a customary rule when the notion of a
democratic right only emerged in the late 1980's? Surely, the quality of the
right should be evaluated from its emergence as a distinct concept. Yet, this
ignores the fact that law does not exist in a vacuum. Human rights are
predicated on the same grounds as democracy - liberty and egalitarianism -
and are conceptualized as interdependent. There is a persuasive case to be
made for a democratic tradition in international law. Even the strongest critics
of democracy are not denying the value of the concept, but rather they are
cautious about accepting it blindly and ignoring the consequences and other
potentially valid ideological perspectives. They are concerned about real
change rather than mere rhetoric.
The rhetoric of democracy has an important role to play in light of the
aforementioned difficulties; for in the absence of systemic democracy at the
international level, it is a way in which international law can legitimately
claim authority to determine the content of democracy at the national and sub-
national level. The difficulty is, however, that democracy is open to
interpretation. On the one hand, various instruments, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,50 represent indices of what is legitimate, and on
the other hand there are the subjective responses of States. On the positive
side, international organs are developing more precise interpretations of the
meaning of democratic entitlement with respect to elections; and this growing
consensus and certainty will lead to internal legitimacy.5 Yet, there is also
evidence of a failure of the democratic rhetoric. For example, the Santiago
Commitment of the OAS has arguably legitimized the practice of interpreting
other States constitutions in the region.52 The lack of objective determination
of these issues is a failure of democratic rhetoric and has manifested itself in
48. Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 29.
49. Id. at 31-32.
50. See generally, Human Rights Declaration, supra note 34.
51. See generally Fox supra note 3, at 48.
52. See Schnably, supra note 8, at 160.
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the poor track record of the OAS. At a doctrinal level, this lack of an
objective democratic rhetoric is quite evident in the contrasting opinions of
writers, a useful cross-section of which the present collection captures. 3 This
is quite apart from the question of whether such a democratic truth is
desirable. As Roth states: "[e]ven a benevolent ideological legitimism will
deprive international law of its indispensable role as an overlapping consensus
among societies that otherwise radically differ on fundamental matters
(including, but not limited to, choices among 'democratic' priorities)."54
These criticisms do not in any way denigrate the efforts and calls for
greater democracy. As some of the essays show, certain features of
democratic governance are successfully being implemented. Rather, these
criticisms sound a warning that crucial obstacles for international law remain
to be overcome before it can legitimately regulate internal matters of
governance. We are moving towards a fragmented international society in this
respect as democracy is enforced on some, requested by others, ignored by
others, and administered by yet others. Unless international law is articulated,
-formed, and enforced in a transparent, coherent, and systematic manner, we
should not put too much faith in its ability to act as a guarantor of democracy.
It is clear that the issue of democratic governance is not simply a matter
of electoral process. It entails a whole bundle of concerns that penetrate to the
heart of a State's capacity to function at the international level. The
fundamental nature of this issue brings into focus the deficiencies of
international law that must not be forgotten in the quest for democracy.5
Neither should we forget that other powerful non-legal concerns may operate
against democracy. Ironically, the system that advocates and requires
"democratic entitlement" may not itself embody many of the attributes of a
democratic polity. There is no clear link between the exercise of power at the
international level and accountability for so doing. Neither can international
law be seen as truly representative of individual interests. These arejust some
of the difficulties facing advocates of the right-orientated thesis that must be
53. See also BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994).
54. Roth, supra note 25, at 442.
55. As Fox and Roth point out: "the putative right embodies a marriage of law and politics that is in
many ways unprecedented in international law. The entitlement is not simply law affected by politics. It
is law that penetrates and regulates the very essence of political life, both domestically and internationally."
Fox & Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy and Its Inplications for International Law.
in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note I, at 18.
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overcome. Before international law turns itself to the task of regulating
domestic constitutional orders, it should perhaps look to getting its own house
in order.
Short questions are often deceptively simple, hiding acutely difficult
issues of fact, interpretation, perception, and understanding of theory, practice
and ideology. All manner of empirical research might be called for and then
rigorously pored over, debated and denied, embraced then eschewed. Take for
example, the question what is democratic governance? Even if this question
is answered, other equally taxing questions demand attention. This engaging
collection of essays does not answer this challenging question but strives to
make our understanding of the intricate complexities and implications of it far
more clear. Democratic Governance and International Law is to be highly
recommended to everyone with a concern for the future development of
international law.

